Acquisition of Right of Way for Highway Purposes in Kentucky--Right of Eminent Domain and Just Compensation by Richardson, James R.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 36 | Issue 2 Article 1
1948
Acquisition of Right of Way for Highway Purposes
in Kentucky--Right of Eminent Domain and Just
Compensation
James R. Richardson
Department of Highways, Commonwealth of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richardson, James R. (1948) "Acquisition of Right of Way for Highway Purposes in Kentucky--Right of Eminent Domain and Just
Compensation," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 36 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol36/iss2/1
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXXVI January, 1948 Number 2
ACQUISITION OF RIGHT OF WAY FOR HIGHTWAY
PURPOSES IN KENTUCKY-RIGHT OF EMINENT
DOMAIN AND JUST COMPENSATION
By JAiES Rm . RICHARDSON*
Section 195 of the Kentucky Constitution secures to the
Commonwealth its right of eminent domain and sets out the right
of the Commonwealth to take property of corporations as well
as individuals for public use. Further, Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes 381.020 provides that
"The Commonwealth retains the right of eminent
domain in and to all real estate."
"Eminent Domain is variously defined as
"The superior right of property subsisting in a
sovereignty by which ,private property may in certain
cases be taken or its use controlled for the public bene-
fit, without regard to the wishes of the owner,"' and
"The right of every government to appropriate,
otherwise than by taxation and its police authority
(which are distinct powers), private property for public
use,": or simply the power to take private property for
public use.
An incident to the taking of property for public use is
payment therefor. It is fundamental law in the United States
that property shall not be taken for a public purpose without
the payment of "just compensation." The Fifth Amendment 4 to
the Federal Constitution has expressly imposed this restriction
on the Congress. The Fourteenth Amendment,5 while not so
*LL.B., University of Kentucky. Address: Law Section, State
Department of Highways, Frankfort, Kentucky
"BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY, 1008.
DHLION, MUNI A. CORPORATIONS, sec. 584.
' West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 536 (U.S. 1848).
'That part of the Fifth Amendment relevant hereto provides
that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation."
The second section of Amendment 14 provides that no State
shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.
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specific, has been held to impose such restriction on the States.6
From this it is inferred that due process of law as applied to the
right of Eminent Domain includes just compensation.
Irrespective of the guarantee in the Fifteenth Amendment,
only North Carolina and New Hampshire have not provided a
just compensation clause in their constitutions. In New Hamp-
shire7 the Courts hold that compensation is a fundamental right,
and North Carolina reads this provision into its constitution
through the "due process" clause.8 The Kentucky Constitution,
Sec. 13, stipulates that.
" --nor shall any man's property be taken or
applied to public use without the consent of his rep-
resentatives and without just compensation being pre-
viously made to him."
and Section 242 provides
"Municipal and other corporations and individuals
invested with the privilege of taking private property
for public use shall make just compensation for prop-
erty taken, injured or destroyed by them; which com-
pensation shall be paid or secured at the election of
such corporation before such injury or destruction."
As Kentucky has the just compensation clause in its con-
stitution, the question arises as to what is just compensation in
condemnation proceedings. In Constitutional construction, the
words "just," "ample," "full," "adequate," "due," etc., pre-
fixed to the word "compensation" have been said to lend no
appreciable additional weight but much stress has often been
put on their use by the courts.
"Just Compensation," as provided for in the Kentuckv
Constitution, has been held to be the value of the land at the
time of the taking,'0 and the value of the land taken by eminent
domain is fixed at a price at which an owner who desires to sell,
but is not required to do so, would sell the property, in its con-
dition at the time of the taking, to a person who desires to pur-
chase, but is not compelled to do so."1
'McCoy v Union Elevated Co., 247 U.S. 354, 38 S.Ct. 504, 62
L.Ed. 1156. (1917).
'Petition of Mt. Washington Rd. Co., 35 N.H. 134 (1857).
8 OaqEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN, Sec. 1.
RAND, EMINENT DOMAIN, Sec. 223."Brock v. Harlan County, 297 Ky. 113, 179 S.W (2) 202 (1944).
'Commonwealth v Begley 272 Ky 289, 114 S.W (2) 127
(1938).
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The value has been differently phrased as the difference
between the fair market value immediately before
and immediately after the taking,12 and an existing
established market value, even.though the owner declines to sell
at such figure, is the yardstick n determining what the govern-
ment must pay if it decides to take property through condemna-
tion proceedings.1 3 "Just Compensation" has been held to mean
payment in money 14 The Broadway Coal Mining Case, supra,
so holding, was decided n 1910, and the, well considered. opinion
of the court was written by Judge Carroll. The subject matter
of this case will be discussed later on the question of assessment
of damages. The writer feels that the opinion of Judge Carroll
is the law in this state and it is recommended for study of the
practitioner who is confronted with the problem of damages in
eminent domain cases.
PROCEDURE IN CONDEMNATION
By KRS 177.080, the Department of Highways may insti-
tute proceedings in the county court of the county where the
land lies to have any right of way, permanent or temporary,
condemned and the damages assessed. Suit is brought by the
County Attorney n the name of the State. By KRS 176.280, the
County Attorney is required to render legal service to the De-
partment of Highways in carrying out its duties, but not outside
Ins county KRS 177.100 provides that all condemnation pro-
ceedings instituted under the provisions of KRS 177.080 shall be
in the manner provided n ]RS 416.010 -to 416.080. This pro-
cedure provides that a petition shall be filed n the office of the
County Clerk of the County in winch the land is situate. The
petition must give a particular description of the land sought
to be condemned and apply for appointment of commissioners
to assess the damages the owner is entitled to receive. Upon such
petition being filed, by KRS 416.020, the court is directed to
appoint as commissioners three impartial- housekeepers of the
county who are landowners. The Commissioners, after being
duly sworn, view the land to be taken and award the owner the
Commonwealth v Powell, 258 Ky. 131, 79 S.W (2) 411 (1935)
"Louisville Flying Service v. U.S., 64 F Supp. 938 (1945)
"Broadway Coal Mining Co. v Smith, 136 Ky 725, 125 S.W 157
(1910).
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value of the land taken. In addition they are to award incidental
damages to the remainder, but from such incidental damages
awarded they may deduct the value of the advantages and bene-
fits that will accrue to the adjacent lands from the construction
and prudent operation of the highway proposed to be con-
structed. This question of incidental benefits is one which will
merit further consideration in the discussion of assessment of
damages.
The commissioners are required to file with the County
Court a written report of their findings in damages. Pursuant
to KRS 416.030, the clerk of the court issues process against the
owner to show cause why the report of commissioners should not
be confirmed. At the next regular term of the court, under the
provisions of KRS 416.040, the Court enters an order confirming
the report, if no exceptions have been filed.
In the event that exceptions are timely filed, the court is
directed by KRS 416.050 to impanel a jury to try the issues of
fact raised by the exceptions. Either party may appeal to the
Circuit Court, provided that such appeal is taken within thirty
days. Should the condemnor wish, it may pay the damages
assessed in County Court to the Master Commissioner of the
Circuit Court and thereby gain immediate possession of the con-
demned premises. This procedure is sometimes followed in right
of way cases to avoid the often lengthy delay occasioned by
appeals.
As to the verdict of the jury in condemnation cases, KRS
29.330 provides that in all trials of civil actions in the Circuit
Courts, three-fourths or more of the jurors concurring may
render a verdict. However, section 242 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion provides that condemnation cases shall be tried by a jury
according to the course of the common law. A trial by jury as
understood and applied at common law means that the jury
should consist of 12 men neither more nor less, and that the ver-
dict should be nanimous.is No Kentucky cases on this point
have been found. However, the principle has been invoked suc-
cessfully of late in condemnation cases, and correctly it is sub-
mitted, as the constitutional provision is superior to that of the
statute.
'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 37 F Supp. 949 (1941).
HIGHWAYS--EMM3ENT DomAiN-
An alternate procedure for condemnation of right of way is
provided by KRS 416.115, whereby action is authorized to be
instituted in Circuit Court, commenced by petition and sum-
mons and carried on in a manner similar to actions at law. This
latter procedure is most frequently followed as it eliminates
much time consuming delay connected with proceedings in
County Court.
There are two elements necessary to and conditions pre-
cedent to institution of condemnation proceedings. Firstly, it
must be alleged and shown in the petition that the Highway
Commission was unable to agree with the owner as to the value
of the right of way Is Recently an action to condemn right of
way in Rockcastle County was dismissed when the defendant
showed that the Highway Department had made no preliminary
negotiations in attempt to purchase. Secondly, the necessity of
the taking for public use must be shown when made an issue by
the defendant, and it is a question of law.' 7 Where this point has
been put in issue the courts have accepted a certified copy of
official order of the Highway Department in regard to the
particular right of way as conclusive on question of necessity
This is so, as by KRS 177.010 the Highway Department has the
right to exercise its discretion in determining public roads of
the primary system to be constructed and maintained. The only
question for the jury in condemnation proceedings is the amount
of compensation.' 8
As attempt to purchase right of way must be shown, it fol-
lows that by KRS 177.070 (1) the Highway Department is
given the right to agree with any landowner as to the value of
land for right of way purposes and, by Sub-section (2) of the
same section, any owner may donate a right of way across is
land. Right of way is frequently obtained without cash consid-
eration in rural areas where roads are greatly desired and
necessary to open up the area by what are called farm to market
roads. Conversely, in areas where the residents do not wish a new
road, or an old one rerouted, right of way is at times found zo
' Postlethweighte v. Towery, 258 Ky. 468, 80 S.W (2) 541 (1935).
"Royal Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Elkhorn Corp. 199 Ky. 8, 237 S.W
1083 (1922).
1 Baxter v City of Louisville, 224 Ky. 604, 6 S.W (2) 1074
(1928).
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high as to be prohibitive. In such instances projects have been
abandoned.
The proceedings discussed above all contemplate ordinary
processes in the courts of law before condemned property is
taken. A slight variation is provided where on appeal the con-
demnor may take immediate possession upon paying into court
the amount allowed in county court.
During the National Emergency the Federal Government
recognized the necessity of immediate possession for defense
purposes and passed the Defense Highway Act,19 winch gave the
federal agencies concerned the right to enter upon and take
possession for right of way purposes where negotiations for
purchase failed. The procedure was a declaration of taking,
previously authorized, in construction of other public buildings
and facilities. 20 Under the declaration of taing, the acquiring
authority was entitled to immediate possession upon filing in
Federal District Court a statement of the-necessity and use, and
deposit of a sum of money deemed adequate by the acquiring
authority to compensate the landowner.
It is believed that a statute authorizing a procedure whereby
the Department of Highways might take immediate possession
upon deposit of money in court would not be violative of our
constitution. Section 242 Kentucky Constitution provides that
compensation must be paid or secured. Payment into court
would secure the payment of all damages to be incurred.
PROPERTY THAT TWAY BE TAKEN AND "PUBLIC USE"
The power of eminent domain extends to every kind of
property, both real and personal, within the jurisdiction of the
sovereignty authorizing its exercise, including dwelling houses
and buildings.21 It seems to be the generally accepted view of
the laymen that right of way through a cemetery may not be
condemned. The writer recently read such statement in a maga-
zine of national circulation. The contrary is true, unless ceme-
tery property is specifically exempti by statute, 2 and property
devoted to cemetery purposes has been held subject to condem-
"U.S.C.A. Title 23 Sec. 114.
21 U.S.C.A. Title 40 Sec. 258-a.
',18 AM. JuR. 82.
'2109 A.L.R. 1506.
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nation under a general eminent domain statute.23 It has been
held that a slight curvature will be made in a public road, rather
than have it take part of a public school house, unless the neces-
sity for a straight location affirmatively appears.
24
At tins time it is well to refer to previous definitions of
eminent domain which in effect is "the taking of private prop-
erty for public use."
From the last two mentioned cases, it can be seen that in
a strict sense the definition is not correct. The general opinion
gathered from the authorities is that property previously dedi-
cated to a public use may be condemned for a public use if the
latter use is greater. Land devoted to hospital uses may be taken
for streets and highways, 25 and a highway may be established
across a railway and the land of the company condemned for
that purpose subject to the restriction that the crossing will be
such that the use of the highway will not deprive the railroad
of the use of its tracks.26 On the other hand, highway property
may not be condemned for another public use which will inter-
fere with its use for highway purposes. For instance, a state
agency with power to condemn land for a school building would
not authorize the obstruction or closing of a public highway 
2 7
However, a highway may be burdened with additional public
uses so long as they do not interfere with highway purposes. By
KRS 177.110 railroads may construct lines across public high-
ways subject to rules and regulations of the Department of
Highways. Telephone and telegraph companies are by KRS
278.540 given the right to construct lines on and along public
highways, but not in such manner as to interfere with travel on
the road. On the question of public uses, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals has held that where a new public use will destroy the
previous use to which the property was devoted, the power to
eondenm the property for such new use must be conferred in
express terms, but general authority is sufficient where the new
public use will not destroy or materially interfere with the
I Re Board of Street Openings, 133 N.Y. 329, 31 N.E. 102 (1892)
'448 L.R.A. (N.S.) 490, 491.
'Penn. Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 38 S.Ct. 35 (1917).
'Ft. Wayne v. Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co., 132 Ind. 558, 32 N.E. 215
(1893).
"48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 489.
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original use to which dedicated.28 Under this decision and the
general weight of authority, it seems that current objections to
the proposed new Louisville Belt Line Highway which takes in
part of Cherokee Park will not be tenable.
It has been shown that public property may in certain
cases be taken for public use. So may private property be taken
for private use in rare instances. KRS 381.580 provides for
condemnation of a private passway over the lands of another
where necessary to attend courts, elections, meeting house or
railroad depot, or to reach a warehouse, ferry, railroad switch,
etc.
In general all lands held by private owners within the geo-
graphical limits of the United States are subject to the authority
of the Federal Government to take them for such objects as are
germane to the execution of the powers granted it,29 but the
United States cannot take property devoted to a public use and
the loss of which would interfere with the performance of its
governmental duties by the state.8 0 It seems the weight of auth-
ority is that a state cannot condemn property within its borders
for the use of another state,I and a state cannot condemn land
held by the United States and used for public purposes.32
There does not seem to be any satisfactory comprehensive
definition of the term "public use." The difficulty in composing
one is probably due to the double meaning of the word "use,"
which may be either employment or advantage. One author on
this subject takes the view that the word has been given too
broad a meaning in taking land for the many purposes permitted
as public use.8 8 The following have been held to be public uses:
An almshouse-Heyward v City of New York, 7 N. Y 314,
A public bath-Poillon v City of Brooklyn, 101 N. Y 132,
4 N. E. 191 (1886),
A school house-Reed v Inhabitants of Acton, 117 Mass.
384 (1875)
' L. & N. Ry. Co. v. City of Lousville, 131 Ky. 108, 114 S.W 743
(1908).
'Cherokee Nation v. R. Co. 135 U.S. 641, 10 S.Ct. 965 (1889).
'The Collector v. Day, 11 Wall 113 (U.S. 1870)
'Kohl v. U.S. 791 U.S. 367, 23 L. Ed. 449 (1875).
"U.S. v Chicago, 7 How. 185 (U.S. 1849)
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, sees. 206-211.
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A market-In re Cooper, 28 Hun 515 (N. Y. 1883),
Telegraph & Telephone Lines-Locke v Tele. Co., 103 Ill.
401 (1882),
Waterworks-Bailey v Woburn, 126 Mass. 416 (1877),
Drainage-Wilson v Marsh, 2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829),
Sewers-Hildreth v City of Lowell, 11 Gray 345 (Mass.
1858),
Irrgation-Umatilla Irr. Co. v Barnhart, 22 Ore. 389, 30
Pac. 37 (1892),
Forts-Armories and Arsenals-Kohl v *U. S. supra note
31 (1875),
Turnpikes-In re Mt. Wash. Rd. Co., 35 N. H. 134 (1857),
Summer resort restaurant-Prospect Park v C. I. Ry Co.,
91 N. Y. 552 (1883),
Parks--City of Lex. v Assembly, 114 Ky 781, 71 S.W 943
(1903), and
Cemeteries-Balch v County Conrs., 103 Mass. 106 (1869)
TITLE AN RIGHT ACQUIRED
As a general rule where land is condemned for highway
purposes, the public acquires merely an easement, m the ab-
sence of special statutes, conveyances or other conditions, such
easement being the right of travel thereon. The owner of the
fee retains the right to make any use of the land, above the sur
face or below, winch is not inconsistent with the exercise of the
public easement. 34 Kentucky cases hold that condemnation of
land for a roadway does not vest the title but only the use of
the right of way in the public authority 3r It is well settled that
thi right may be abandoned. When land is taken for a public
road it remains the property of the owner subject to easement
of the public which ceases on termination of the public use.30
but to constitute abandonment there must be an intention to
abandon as well as actual relinquishment of the way or right,37
and mere non-user of an easement acquired by the exercise of
" 18 AM. JuR. Sec. 120.
=Lexington Turnpike Co. v. McMurtry, 42 Ky (3 B. Mon) 516
(1843).
Keown v. Brandon, 206 Ky. 93, 266 S.W 889 (1924).
,Canton Co. of Baltimore v. R. Co., 99 Md. 202, 57 Atl. 637
(1904).
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eminent domain does not destroy the easement.3 S Should the
purpose for which the land was taken be totally abandoned and
cease, there is a reverter to the owner.39
Though, as stated, a fee may be taken, such intent must be
clearly shown, and it would seem that necessity for such must
be apparent. A warranty deed conveying "right of way" in
fee simple to a railroad company in consideration of construc-
tion of contemplated railroad thereon and the additional con-
sideration of one dollar, was held to convey an easement and
not fee simple title, so that upon abandonment of the railroad
the land reverted to the grantor or its successor in title.40 The
court said that an unconditional conveyance for a certain
purpose, namely right of way, did not convey a fee simple title
and there was an abandonment where the company tore up its
traoks and attempted to sell the right of way Here the inten-
tion of the parties and the consideration paid were of weight
in the decision reached.
The 1946 session of the Legislature passed an act 4 ' which
gave the Department of Highways authority to acqire
privat'e or public property and property rights including
rights of access, air, view, and light, for limited access facili-
ties by gift, devise, purchase or condemnation, and the High-
way authority may acquire an entire lot, block or tract of
land, if in its opinion the interests of the public will best be
served, though not inediately needed for right of way
proper. Limited access facility is the name given a highway
or street especially designed for through traffic. This statute
not only gives the right to acquire in fee but also to acquire
property in excess of amount needed for right of way pur-
poses. It is anticipated that the constitutionality of this por-
tion of the act will be questioned.
It is a fundamental rule that property acquired for right
of way may not be diverted to another use.42 If the new use
I Curran v. City of Louisville, 83 Ky. 628, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 734
(1886).
' Miller v. Ry. Co., 43 Ind. App. 540, 88 N.E. 102 (1909).
'Mammoth Cave Pk. v. St. Highway Com., 261 Ky 769, 88 S.W
(2) 931 (1935).
KRS 177.250.
Kershaw Motor Co. v. Southern Ry Co., 136 S.C. 377, 134
S.E. 377 (1926).
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is of an entirely different character, the public easement is
lost.4 3 The authority may merely subject the easement to an
additional servitude which would by its nature not be such
change as would constitute an abandonment of the easement
but would entitle the owner to additional pay Where a rail-
road company leased a portion of its right of way to a fuel
company for the purpose of erecting thereon a store building
the grantor of the right of way was held entitled to recover
the reasonable rental value of the land on which the building
stood. 44 Though land taken for highway purposes must be so
used and there is only an easement therein, it is well to bear
in mind that the right of the owner of the fee is subordinate
to the public easement and when any conflict arises the owner
must give way
COM ENSATION AND DAMAGES
In the very early days of our country it was customary to
acquire highway right of way without compensation to the
owner of the iand taken. This procedure was justified by
reason of reservations in grants of public lands, small value
of undeveloped lands and the pressing need for roadways. As
has been shown, property owners are now protected against
such acts by guarantees m most of the state constitutions and
by amendments to the Federal Constitution. It is readily seen
that tins change in the law was necessary and brought about
by economic changes and development, whereby real prop-
erty values became enhanced.
A. Assessment of Damages. As has been previously
stated, an owner is entitled to just compensation, or the fair
market value of land taken for highw av purposes. It is a rare
case where there is not damage to the remainder of the land
and this is direct damage which is a proper item of damage.4 5
The prchase price or award includes value of fencing and
other improvements taken.4 6 Fruit trees are proper items of
damage (Combs case, supra) as are shade trees and shrub-
4Neitzel v. S. I. Ry. Co., 65 Wash. 100, 117 Pac. 864 (1911)
"Taylor v. Winson & P C. Ry. Co., 217 Ky. 698, 290 S.W 507
(1927).
' Commonwealth v Combs, 244 Ky. 204, 50 S.W (2) 497 (1932)4
1Perry County v. Riley, 268 Ky 325,,104 S.W (2) 1090 (1937).
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bery -7 The Combs case sets out instructions which the court
of appeals directed to be given in a right of way condem-
nation case. These instructions provide for payment to owner
for value of property taken plus direct damage to the re-
mainder by reason of the situation m which it was placed bv
the taking. Damage to the remainder of the land is usuall-
that which is occasioned by splitting a parcel of land in two
and is known as severance damage. As an illustration, a
hundred acre farm would ordinarily be decreased m value
when split in halves by a roadway The farm for use as a unit
would definitely have its value impaired. Included m the
damages would be various inconveniences in use, as driving
livestock across the road or crossing the road from dwelling
to other farm buildings. The grade may be lower or higher in
front of property thereby damaging ingress and egress.
which is a protected property right.48 The question of access
is aptly discussed m a Georgia case, wherein it is said that the
right of access to a highway may not be taken from abutting
owners or materially impaired without compensation. But, in-
convenience is not construed as materially impairing. It is well
settled that the State may m public interest interfere with or
even prevent access at certain points. This is not the damage
to private property prohibited by the Constitution. Access is
had at another point though less convenient. The right of
access does not mean access at a specific point. 49
In most jurisdictions, evidence of sales of similar prop-
erty in the neighborhood is admissible on direct examination
to prove the market value of the property in question."' In
the Combs case, sztpra, the court said that evidence should not
be received on this point to prove what offers have been made
to sell or what prices have been asked or refused. The fact that
property is peculiarly adaptable to a special purpose or use
may be considered in assessing damages.5i If the land pos-
sesses a special value to the owner, sentiment excluded, which
'Adams v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 38, 146 S.W (2) 7 (1940)
'McCreary County v Roberts, 292 Ky. 527, 166 S.W.(2) 977
(1942.)
'State Highway Board v. Baxter, 167 Ga. 124, 144 S.E. 796
(1928).
Kansas City Ry. v. Hooke, 331 Mo. 429, 53 S.W (2) 891 (1932).
Miss. v Patterson, 9q U.S. 403, 25 L.Ed. (1878).
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can be measured in money, this may be shown. 5 2 Possible uses
of the property which are purely speculative are not adnus-
sible on question of damages.53
When assessing damages to property taken, in addition
to direct damages, i.e., value of property taken and damage lo
remainder, there often arises the question of indirect oi- in-
cidental damages to the remainder. Just what incidental
damages constitute I have not found defined in Kentucky or
other jurisdictions. In discussing the question with varions
trial judges and giving consideration to the matter, I have
reached the conclusion that "incidental damages" probably
had its origin m railroad right of way cases. The phrase
would seem to include smoke from trains and noises that would
scare livestock. Kentucky now has a statute which provides that
incidental damages may be offset by advantages to the owner
from the building of the road.-4 Such a set-off is permissible in
many jurisdictions, and m some damages to the remainder may
be set off by benefits which are genuine and capable of estuna-
tion in money 55
The Broadway AMimng case, supra, is a leading case on the
question of assessment of damages and contains an exhaustive
analysis of the subject. It notes that section 242 of our Kentucky
Constitution provides that an owner must be compensated for
property taken, injured or destroyed. The words "injured or
destroyed" were added over and above the provision for taking
only as stated in section 18 of the constitution. IHence the
opinion concludes that the owner must be paid in money for
property taken and for the remainder injured or destroyed
without consideration as to enhancement of value by reason of
the building of the road.
In L. & Y Ry. Co. v Chenault,56 the railroad company took
right of way through the appellees' land and contended it
should be allowed to show benefits accruing to the remainder.
The Court said such benefits were too speculative and remote in
"Brown v. Weaver Power Co., 140 N.C. 333, 52 S.E. 954 (1905)
"White v Chicago Ry. Co., 122 Ind. 317, 23 N.E. 782 (1890)
"'KRS 416.120.
18 Am. JUR., Sec. 297.
'214 Ky. 748, 284 S.W 397 (1926).
L. J. -2
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holding that an owner must be paid in money, not benefits, for
the damage to his land.
In view of various decisions and constitutional provisions
it is not believed that the statutory provision for offsetting
damages by benefits would survive a test on its constitutionality
The Department of Highways now makes no effort to secure an
instruction on benefits in right of way cases.
B. ASSESSED VALu ATION AS A MEASURE Irz ASSESS'MENT OF
DAMAGES.
It would seem that the value a person puts on his property
when he lists it for taxation should have a direct bearing on its
value when part thereof is taken for public purposes. Such is
not the case in practical application.
In a condemnation proceeding, the Commonwealth con-
demned certain lands near Burnside, Kentucky, to be used in
the construction of approaches to a toll bridge.57 In its opinion
the Court said "It is the well settled rule in this State that in
such action the property owner's assessment list for taxation is
competent evidence on the amount of damages sought to be re-
covered, but its weight and effect is to be determined entirely
by the jury trying the case." The decision means that, in trying
the case, the condemnor is permitted to call the County Tax
Commissioner as a witness and have him testify as to the as-
sessed valuation. However, the weight to be given such evidence
was entirely left to the discretion of the jury The facts showed
that the State was taking the entire acreage (8.31) in 1933,
which was purchased in 1926 at a price of $2,500.00, and assessed
for taxation at $1,150.00, the jury returned a verdict of
$2,500.00, disregarding the evidence on assessed valuation.
In L. & N Ry. Co. v White Villa Chtub,rs the court said
that evidence as to assessed valuation was competent but not
controlling. The Court continued to the effect that generally
speaking it is well understood by juries and everybody else that
the amount at which property is assessed throws little light on
its actual value and the assessed value would have little weight
with juries in ascertaining real values.
Davidson v Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 568, 61 S.W. (2) 34 (1933).
' 155 Ky 452, 159 S.W 983 (1913)
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In reading the cases on this point, I find no comment on
section 272 of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides "all
property not exempt from taxation by tins constitution, shall
be assessed for taxation as its fair cash value." On the contrary,
the court seems to take judicial notice of the fact that property
is not listed for taxation at its fair cash value.
In Commonwealth v Powell,5 9 the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals states as follows
"It would be extremely unfair to say that defend-
ants, after fixing themselves the value of their farm so
as to reduce their taxes (being their contribution to the
public treasury) should not be confronted therewith
when they seek to take from that fund the damages to
the same property resulting from appropriating a frac-
tional part thereof to the public use. It would appear
unequitable to take such diametrically opposed posi-
tions affecting the public treasury"
These are high sounding words, but left meaningless in
light of the decisions on this subject.
Consider Johnson County v Boyd,60 wherein the court says
"Although defendants may have listed their property for taxa-
tion so far below its real value as to amount to a fraud upon
the taxing authorities, such action on their part does not prevent
them from collecting the reasonable market value of the land
taken and the direct resultant damages to the remaining
property "
It is conceded that assessed valuation could not and should
not be accepted as the sole criterion in assessing damages in
condemnation proceedings. To accept such standard would
amount to erroneous adoption of the assumption that value for
tax purposes and value for condemnation are one and the same.
It is a notorious fact that property is rarely, if ever, listed for
taxation at market value and the courts generally in reviewing
tax valuations limit themselves to corrections of over valuation
and inequality Indeed, Kentucky is in the minority for the
courts generally have taken the view that assessed valuation is
inadmissible as evidence of market value in condemnation
proceedings.0 '
258 Ky. 131, 79 S.W (2) 411 (1935).
293 Ky. 337, 168 S.W (2) 1019 (1943).
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C. INADEQUATE AND EXCESSIVE DAMIAGES.
Our Court of Appeals has consistently held that the amount
of damages in condemnation proceedings is peculiarly a question
for the jury, and its verdict will not be disturbed unless so ex-
cessive or inadequate as to show passion or prejudice, or unless
based on estimates unsupported by the physical facts, or so
extravagant as to carry with them the improbability of their
correctness.
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This rule ir followed for the reasons that, as previously
pointed out, the jurors must be landowners, see and hear the
witnesses and in most instances view the land taken.
In many condemnation suits, the -value placed on land by
the owner and his witnesses varies widely from that of qualified
witnesses procured by the condemnor.
It is then incumbent upon the jury to determine a figure to
reach a verdict which, if within the limits of damages fixed by
the witnesses and supported by the physical facts, will be sus-
tainea by the court.0 3
Where testimony of witnesses as to value is highly contra-
dictory, it is within the province of the jury to reconcile the
contradictions and arrive at a true verdict in the light of all
facts and circumstances. It is only where the verdict at first
blush strikes the mind of the court as having been influenced
by passion or prejudice or some other motive that shocks the
conscience of the court, that it will be set aside as flagrantlv
against the evidence. 64
l)AUAGES SUBSEQUENTLY ACCRUING.
Damages to private property by public improvement, when
asessed, are assessed once and for all, and include all damages
sustained by the owner, present or future, by reason of a proper
use and maintenance of the public improvement.6 5 Damages
assessed in condemnation cases do not include damage that may
result from negligent construction of a road. Negligent con-
struction or maintenance of a road may subsequent to the con-
' Bringardner Lumber Co. v. Knuckles, 278 Ky. 356, 128 S.W
(2) 727 (1939)
G Commonwealth v Ball, 246 Ky. 584, 55 S.W (2) 413 (1932).
'Bell's Comm. v Harrodsburg, 192 Ky 7.00, 234 S.W 311 (1921).
' 18 Am. Jur., see. 369.
HIGHWAYS-EmIN7ENT Do:uAIN
denmation proceedings result m flooding or slides. What may or
may not happen by an improper construction of the road, or by
its negligent operation, are not matters that enter into the award
of compensation. 0
Such losses are not ones winch either party had cause to
anticipate and the possibility of such, if suggested, would have
been rejected as speculative and conjectural in the condemnation
proceedings, and having been incurred, may be compensated for
in a subsequent action.
0L. & N. Railway Co. v. Asher, 12 Ky. L. R. 815, 15 S.W 517
(1891).
